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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred by determining, sua sponte, that 
the 04/14/08 sentence was an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 
22 (e) . Whether a sentence is illegal and qualifies for review 
under Rule 22 (e) is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f9, 84 P.3d 854 
(citing State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, 1MI13-14, 48 P.3d 228 (per 
curiam)) . Rule 22 (e) permits the appellate court to consider the 
legality of a sentence even if the issue is raised for the first 
time on appeal. See State v. Brooks, 908 P. 2d 856, 860 (Utah 
1995); State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860) . 
Alternatively, the court should consider the issue under the 
plain error doctrine. The requirements for plain error are that 
an error must have occurred, must have been harmful, and should 
have been obvious to the trial court. See State v. Beck, 2007 UT 
60, fllO, 165 P.3d 1225. An error is harmful if "absent the error 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the defendant." Id. 
1 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving the review of a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e) 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. This also applies to 
issues involving plain error. 
2. Whether the sentencing court, by failing to duly 
consider the objections to the presentence report and thereby 
failing to specifically resolve them on the record, failed to 
comply with its legal duty to properly resolve presentence 
investigation report objections. "Whether the sentencing court 
properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record the 
accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports is a 
question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, fl3, 6 P. 3d 1133 
(citing State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 1132, 999 P.2d 7). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Mr. Waterfield preserved this issue by way of his objections to 
Presentence Report set forth at R. 470:19-30. 
3. Whether appointed trial counsel, to the extent that 
there was no affirmative request that the sentencing court 
exercise its fact finding function to resolve the remaining 
presentence report objections, denied Mr. Waterfield of his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. To make 
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such a showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel 
rendered a deficient performance, falling below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that 
counsel's performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 
803 (Utah 1988) . The appellate court reviews such a claim as a 
matter of law. State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, f5, 122 P.3d 
895; State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 1(20, 984 P.2d 376; State v. 
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
U.S. Const. amend. VI 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, if 
any, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the 
body and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In December, 2007, Mr. Waterfield entered a plea of guilty to 
Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine) and Possession of a Controlled Substance 
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(Heroin) in a Drug Free Zone, both second-degree felonies. The 
district court sentenced Mr. Waterfield to two consecutive 
indeterminate terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison, which the court suspended. The court then sentenced Mr. 
Waterfield to one year in jail and 72 months of probation. 
Upon admitting to violations of probation on April 14, 2008, 
the court revoked and reinstated probation, sentencing Mr. 
Waterfield to one year in jail and ordering him to be screened, 
enter into, and complete the RSAT Program. Shortly thereafter, 
Mr. Waterfield was briefly screened for entry into the RSAT 
Program. 
By way of Report filed May 15, 2008, AP&P alleged, based on 
the screening, that Mr. Waterfield had violated probation by 
failing to enter into, participate in, or complete the RSAT 
Program as directed by the court. At the subsequent hearing on 
May 19, 2008, by way of stipulation, the court sentenced Mr. 
Waterfield to the original two indeterminate, consecutive terms of 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
On September 8, 2008, the district court sua sponte suspended 
the sentence imposed on April 14, 2008, as an illegal sentence 
pursuant to Rule 22 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
At sentencing, Mr. Waterfield raised numerous objections to 
the Presentence Report, which corrections the court simply 
4 
accepted- The district court sentenced Mr. Waterfield to two 
indeterminate terms of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison to be served consecutively. 
The Sentence, Judgment, Commitment was signed by the district 
court on October 8, 2008. Mr. Waterfield filed a timely pro se 
Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 10, 2007, Mr. Waterfield appeared with trial 
counsel before the district court and entered a plea of guilty to 
Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine) and Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(Heroin) in a Drug Free Zone, both second-degree felonies (R. 
180) . As part of the plea agreement, all remaining charges in all 
other cases were dismissed (R. 183). 
2. That same day Mr. Waterfield executed a Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Guilty Pleas and Certificate of Counsel 
(R. 180-87). 
3. Based on the guilty pleas, the district court sentenced 
Mr. Waterfield to two consecutive indeterminate terms of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison, which the court suspended (R. 165). The court then 
sentenced Mr. Waterfield to one year in jail and 72 months of 
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probation to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole (AP&P) (R. 
166) . 
4. Pursuant to a subsequent AP&P Progress/Violation Report 
and Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the parties 
appeared for an Order to Show Cause Hearing on April 14, 2 008 (R. 
459A). After Mr. Waterfield's admissions, the court revoked his 
probation, which it then reinstated for 72 months to begin as of 
that same date (R. 211). See R. 210-11, Post Sentencing 
Judgment/Commitment, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
to this Brief as Addendum A. The court sentenced Mr. Waterfield 
to one year in the Davis County Jail with commitment to begin 
immediately, and then ordered Mr. Waterfield to be screened, enter 
into, and complete the RSAT1 Program (Id.) . 
5. On April 29, 2 0 08, Mr. Dave Hoffman of Davis Behavioral 
Health met briefly with Mr. Waterfield to screen him for entry 
into the RSAT Program (R. 23 0/ R. 346) . 
6. By way of a Progress/Violation Report filed May 15, 
2008, AP&P alleged, based on Mr. Hoffman's screening of Mr. 
Waterfield, that Mr. Waterfield's diagnosis indicated the need for 
long term, intensive inpatient treatment rather than the RSAT 
Program (R. 231) . Based on this, AP&P claimed that Mr. Waterfield 
Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (R. 346). 
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had violated probation by failing to enter into, participate in, 
or complete the RSAT Program as directed by the court (R. 233-34) . 
7. At the subsequent hearing on May 19, 2 008, pursuant to 
a stipulation of the parties that Mr. Waterfield had not been 
accepted into the RSAT Program, the court sentenced Mr. Waterfield 
to the original two indeterminate terms of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison to be served 
consecutively (R. 237-38).2 
8. In a Motion to Appoint Counsel filed by Mr. Waterfield's 
retained trial counsel, counsel asserted the illegality of the 
sentence imposed on May 19, 2008, due to Mr. Waterfield being 
illegally denied access to the RSAT Program, that the level of 
addition had been improperly inflated by the State, that the court 
did not hear from conflicting witnesses regarding Mr. Waterfield's 
denial to the RSAT Program, and that probation had been improperly 
revoked due to no fault of Mr. Waterfield (R. 281).3 
2During the hearing, Mr. Waterfield's trial counsel informed the 
court of various discrepancies between the level of addiction 
asserted by the State by way of the RSAT assessment and the Serenity 
House assessment of Mr. Waterfield (R. 461:4-5). 
3By way of a pro se Rule 22(e) Motion filed on July 1, 2008, Mr. 
Waterfield asserted that the court had imposed an illegal sentence 
based on the grounds set forth in trial counsel's Motion to Appoint 
Counsel (R. 299-303). 
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9. During a review hearing on July 28, 2 008, newly 
appointed counsel requested an evidentiary hearing on Mr. 
Waterfield's pro se Rule 22(e) Motion (R. 466:2:7-9). 
10. At the scheduled evidentiary hearing on August 25, 2008, 
appointed trial counsel subpoenaed Mr. Dave Hoffman and Ms. 
Kimberly Holden to provide testimony concerning the RSAT screening 
and assessment matter (R. 467:2:12-14).4 During that hearing, the 
trial court expressed its concern that the State had abused its 
discretion in the course of screening Mr. Waterfield, and that 
such an abuse of discretion may have violated his right to due 
process (R. 467:5:9-16). 
11. During a Review Hearing on September 8, 2008, the 
district court sua sponte suspended the sentence imposed on April 
14, 2008, as an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 468:2-3).5 See R. 468, 
09/08/08 Review Hearing, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached to this Brief as Addendum B. As a result of the ruling, 
the court stated, u[W]e're back right there. We're at the date of 
4Appointed trial counsel apparently chose not to call these 
witnesses without first obtaining the court's ruling and resolution 
of the State's motion concerning zero tolerance as set forth in the 
terms of probation (R. 467:16:1-9; 467:7:1-18). 
5In a subsequent ruling, the district court also determined that 
the sentencing on May 19, 2008, was invalid due to the lack of a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of a Presentence Report by Mr. 
Waterfield (R. 382) . 
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April 14. [Mr. Waterfield] has just admitted his probation 
violations, and so now I'm going to have that sentencing." (R. 
468:2:19-22) .6 
12. About a week later during an informal, in-chambers 
hearing7 on the RSAT Program assessment utilized by the State, the 
court expressed concern that Mr. Waterfield had not been properly 
screened for the RSAT Program (R. 469:6-7). The court also 
expressed concern that the State had not made a record of the 
criteria that had disqualified Mr. Waterfield from the RSAT 
Program (R. 469:16:2-4). 
13. After listening to the State's informal explanation of 
the RSAT Program assessment, the district court became 
"comfortable" with the situation (R. 469:39:4-8). Appointed trial 
counsel did not make any presentation (R. 469:26:14-16). 
14. At sentencing, Mr. Waterfield raised numerous objections 
to the Presentence Report (R. 470:24-30). The district court then 
simply accepted those corrections (R. 470:30:24-25). 
15. The district court sentenced Mr. Waterfield to two 
indeterminate terms of not less than one year nor more than 
6The district court opined that its ruling rendered the issues 
surrounding the RSAT Program screening moot even though the court 
continued to harbor concerns about the validity of the screening (R. 
468:2:23-25; 468:3:10-11; and 468:9:11-16). 
7Mr. Waterfield was not present at this hearing (R. 334). 
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fifteen years in the Utah State Prison to be served consecutively 
(R. 388-89). 
16. The Sentence, Judgment, Commitment was signed by the 
district court on October 8, 2008, which accordingly was entered 
that same day (R. 3 87-89) . See R. 3 87-89, Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this 
Brief as Addendum C. 
17. On October 14, 2008, Mr. Waterfield filed a timely pro 
se Notice of Appeal (R. 391-93). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred by determining, sua sponte, that 
the 04/14/08 sentence was an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 
22 (e) . The trial court failed to utilize the proper standard in 
the course of setting aside the sentence imposed on 04/14/08 as an 
illegal sentence. Accordingly, the court's basis for setting 
aside or suspending the 04/14/08 sentence constitutes a ''run-of-
the-mill" error, if any, that is not reviewable under Rule 22 (e) . 
As a result of its Rule 22 (e) ruling, the district court 
precluded Mr. Waterfield from challenging the dubious RSAT Program 
assessment. This, in turn, precluded Mr. Waterfield from having 
the court legitimately consider him for a residential drug 
treatment program such as the RSAT Program. 
10 
2. By failing to duly consider the objections to the 
presentence report and thereby failing to specifically resolve 
them on the record, the sentencing court failed to comply with its 
legal duty to properly resolve presentence investigation report 
objections. The record demonstrates that the sentencing court 
failed to duly consider all the inaccuracies set forth in the 
Presentence Report. 
The sentencing judge's general statement concerning its 
resolution of the inaccuracies of Mr. Waterfield's Presentence 
Report is insufficient. In fact, the sentencing judge failed to 
make the specific findings on the record as mandated by the 
statute. By failing to duly consider the inaccuracies, the 
sentencing court did not comply with its duty to properly resolve 
Mr. Waterfield's objections. 
3. To the extent that there was no affirmative request that 
the sentencing court exercise its fact finding function to resolve 
the remaining presentence report objections, appointed trial 
counsel denied Mr. Waterfield of his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. Appointed trial counsel's 
failure fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. This is demonstrated by existing Utah case 
law, as previously discussed, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 77-18-1(6) (a), and the underlying factual circumstances of this 
case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional failure to request that the 
sentencing court utilize its fact finding function, the result at 
sentencing would have been different. Had the sentencing court 
been alerted of its obligation, the court more likely than not 
would have duly considered the inaccuracies set forth in the 
presentence investigation report, which, in turn, would have 
allowed the sentencing court to more fully and accurately consider 
the fact that Mr. Waterfield, to that point, had no real inpatient 
drug treatment program to help treat his addition. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING, SUA SPONTE, 
THAT THE 04/14/08 SENTENCE WAS AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 22(e). 
According to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 (e) , "The 
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time." See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) . "While 
rule 22 (e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any 
time, it must be 'narrowly circumscribed' to prevent abuse." 
State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, fl5, 84 P. 3d 854 (quoting 
State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, 1J5, 48 P.3d 228 (per curiam)).8 
8Rule 22 (e) permits the appellate court to consider the legality 
of a sentence even if the issue is raised for the first time on 
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According to Utah case law, an illegal sentence reviewable 
under Rule 22 (e) is a "patently" illegal sentence9 or a 
"manifestly" illegal sentence.10 "A 'patently' or 'manifestly' 
illegal sentence generally occurs in one of two situations: (1) 
where the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the 
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." State v. 
Garner, 2008 UT App 32, fl7, 177 P. 3d 637 (quoting Thorkelson, 
2004 UT App 9 at ^15). In contrast, "errors [that] . . . can be 
described as ordinary or 'run-of-the-mill' errors [are] regularly 
reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 'and do not qualify for review under rule 22(e)." Id. 
In State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, 203 P.3d 984, the Utah 
Supreme Court found the following definition of an illegal 
sentence to be appropriate: 
[An illegal sentence is] one which is ambiguous 
with respect to the time and manner which it is to 
be served, is internally contradictory, omits a 
appeal. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995); State v. 
Clark, 913 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing Brooks, 908 
P.2d at 860). Alternatively, this court should consider the issue 
under the plain error doctrine. The requirements for plain error are 
that an error must have occurred, must have been harmful, and should 
have been obvious to the trial court. See State v. Beck, 2007 UT 60, 
flO, 165 P.3d 1225. An error is harmful if "absent the error there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
defendant." Id. 
9See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). 
10See State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, %5, 48 P.3d 228 (per curiam). 
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term required to be imposed by statute, is 
uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or 
is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did 
not authorize. 
See id. (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 
(10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted)). Consistent with 
the foregoing definition, such "run-of-the-mill" errors are not 
reviewable under Rule 22 (e) , which include errors such as the 
denial of due process resulting from a trial court's failure to 
consider mitigating evidence, see Garner, 2 0 08 UT App 32 at fl2, 
or a trial court's failure to consider requisite statutory factors 
before imposing consecutive sentences. See Thorkelson, 2004 UT 
App 9 at 1fl2 . 
In this case, the parties appeared pursuant to an AP&P 
probation violation report and affidavit for an order to show 
cause hearing on April 14, 2008. Upon Mr. Waterfield's 
admissions, the court revoked his probation, which it then 
reinstated for 72 months, and sentenced Mr. Weiterfield to one year 
in the Davis County Jail, ordering Mr. Waterfield to be screened, 
enter into, and complete the RSAT Program. Shortly thereafter, a 
brief screening took place by way of an interview of Mr. 
Waterfield. 
By way of a violation report filed May 15, 2008, AP&P 
alleged, based on the screening, that Mr. Waterfield had violated 
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probation by failing to enter into, participate in, or complete 
the RSAT Program as directed by the court. Based on the 
screening, AP&P believed Mr. Waterfield needed an intensive 
inpatient treatment rather than the RSAT Program. 
At a hearing on May 19, 2008, pursuant to stipulation, the 
court sentenced Mr. Waterfield to the original two indeterminate 
terms of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison to be served consecutively. During the hearing, 
Mr. Waterfield's trial counsel informed the court of various 
discrepancies between the level of addiction asserted by the State 
by way of the RSAT assessment and a Serenity House assessment of 
Mr. Waterfield. 
In a Motion to Appoint Counsel, Mr. Waterfield's retained 
trial counsel asserted the illegality of the sentence imposed on 
May 19, 2008, due to Mr. Waterfield being illegally denied access 
to the RSAT Program, that the level of addition had been 
improperly inflated by the State, that the court did not hear from 
conflicting witnesses regarding Mr. Waterfield's denial to the 
RSAT Program, and that probation had been improperly revoked due 
to no fault of Mr. Waterfield. 
At a review hearing on September 8, 2008, the district court 
sua sponte suspended the sentence imposed on April 14, 2008, as an 
illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 22 (e) of the Utah Rules of 
15 
Criminal Procedure.11 The court determined the sentence to be 
illegal due to having failed to suspend the sentence prior to 
sentencing Mr. Waterfield to jail. As a result of the Rule 22(e) 
ruling, the court stated, xx[W]e're back right there. We're at the 
date of April 14. [Mr. Waterfield] has just admitted his probation 
violations, and so now I'm going to have that sentencing." (R. 
468:2:19-22) .12 
In light of the foregoing Utah case law, the trial court 
failed to utilize the proper standard in the course of setting 
aside the sentence imposed on April 14, 2 008, as an illegal 
sentence. Accordingly, the court's basis for setting aside or 
suspending the 04/14/08 sentence constitutes a "run-of-the-mill" 
error, if any, that is not reviewable under Rule 22(e).13 
Consequently, the district court, by way of its ruling, 
precluded Mr. Waterfield from challenging the dubious RSAT Program 
assessment. This, in turn, precluded Mr. Waterfield from having 
nThe district court also determined that the sentencing on May 
19, 2 008, was invalid due to the lack of a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of a Presentence Report by Mr. Waterfield (R. 382). 
l2Based on that ruling, the district court apparently concluded 
that its ruling rendered the issues surrounding the RSAT Program 
screening moot even though the court continued to harbor concerns 
about the validity of the screening (R. 468:2:23-25; 468:3:10-11; and 
468:9:11-16) . 
13This also applies to the reasoning utilized by the district 
court in setting aside the sentence imposed on May 19, 2008. 
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the court legitimately consider him for a residential drug 
treatment program such as the RSAT Program. 
II, BY FAILING TO DULY CONSIDER THE OBJECTIONS TO THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT AND THEREBY FAILING TO 
SPECIFICALLY RESOLVE THEM ON THE RECORD, THE 
SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ITS LEGAL 
DUTY TO PROPERLY RESOLVE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT OBJECTIONS-
According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a), which provides 
in relevant part: 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved 
by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of 
the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. 
If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot 
be resolved, the court shall make a determination 
of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a); see also State v. Maroney, 2004 UT 
App 206, f26, 94 P. 3d 295. "Whether the trial court properly 
complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record the accuracy 
of contested information in sentencing reports is a question of 
law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness." State 
v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, 1|l3, 6 P.3d 1133 (citing State v. Kohl, 
2000 UT 35, 1(32, 999 P.2d 7) . 
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A. Duty to Consider Objections to Presentence 
Investigation Report 
As a matter of compliance, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) 
"requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections 
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the 
information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record 
whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing." 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 1(44, 973 P. 2d 404; State v. Maroney, 
2004 UT App 206, 1f26, 94 P. 3d 295. "If a party fails to challenge 
the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time 
of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (b) . 
B. Failure of Sentencing Judge to Duly Consider 
Objections and Resolve the Inaccuracies 
The record demonstrates that the sentencing court failed to 
duly consider the inaccuracies set forth in the Presentence 
Report. At sentencing, Mr. Waterfield, through appointed counsel, 
raised numerous objections to the Presentence Report, including 
incorrect drug treatment programs in which, according to AP&P, Mr. 
Waterfield had participated (R. 470:19-30). Thereafter, the court 
simply stated that it would "accept those additional corrections." 
(R. 470:30:24-25). As a result, the objections were not resolved 
as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. 
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The sentencing judge's general statement concerning the 
inaccuracies of Mr. Waterfield's Presentence Report is 
insufficient. Cf. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, 1Jl4, 6 P.3d 1137. 
In fact, the sentencing judge "failed to make the specific 
findings on the record as mandated by the statute." Id. at fl5. 
By failing to duly consider the inaccuracies, the sentencing court 
did not comply with its duty to properly resolve Mr. Waterfield's 
objections. 
III. TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE WAS NO AFFIRMATIVE 
REQUEST THAT THE SENTENCING COURT EXERCISE ITS 
FACT FINDING FUNCTION TO RESOLVE THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT OBJECTIONS, APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED 
MR. WATERFIELD OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test 
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment14 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064. This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a 
defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
14The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that w[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). " [T] he right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair 
sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 
838, 842, (1993). 
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
xxx
 identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support ua 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P. 2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah 
1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994); State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
To the extent that appointed trial counsel failed to 
specifically request that the sentencing court exercise its fact 
finding function to resolve the remaining inaccuracies in the 
presentence report, he committed ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Trial counsel's failure fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated by 
existing Utah case law, as previously discussed, the plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) , and the underlying 
factual circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional failure to request that the 
sentencing court utilize its fact finding function, the result at 
sentencing would have been different. Had the sentencing court 
been alerted of its obligation, the court more likely than not 
would have duly considered the inaccuracies set forth in the 
presentence investigation report, which, in turn, would have 
allowed the sentencing court to more fully and accurately consider 
21 
the fact that Mr. Waterfield, to that point, had no real inpatient 
drug treatment program to help treat his addition. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Waterfield respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the trial court's sua sponte Rule 22(e) 
ruling and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this Court's determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th dc^of November, 2009. 
ARNOLD\& WIGGINS, P.C 
Scot t Ll WiogZns 
Counsel f o ^ s ^ p p e l l a n t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following on this |)( day of November, 2009: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, /£rH 84114-0854 
Counsel for the \Sta\e of Utah 
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M Case No: 061700802 
? Date: Apr 14, 2008 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT 
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated 
in the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause: 1, 2 and 3 
The defendant's probation is revoked. 
The defendant's probation is reinstated for 72 months beginning 
April 14, 2008. 
OTHER: All previous terms and conditions of probation will remain. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Defendant is to serve 12 Months in the Davis County Jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail for service. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
To the Davis County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for confinement. 
POST SENTENCE JAIL NOTE 
Defendant is to be screened, enter into and complete the RSAT 
Program. 
Per court order, probation was revoked in Court but should have 
been revoked and reinstated. Court so orders that in this minute 
entry. 
Dated t h i s <3 \ day of Qjp*M \ , 20 fi% . 
JON M. MEMMOTT 
District Court Judge 
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DIGITAL VIDEO TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 061700802 
BRYAN WATERFIELD, 
DEFENDANT. 
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SEPTEMBER 8, 2008 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MR. MATTHEW T. JOHNSON 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. RYAN J. BUSHELL 
***** 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
ORRWM-
4V& 
SEPTEMBER 8, 2008. 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS BRYAN WATERFIELD. 
BEFORE WE ADDRESS THE RULING OF LEGAL COUNSEL, LET ME JUST 
TELL YOU. UNDER -- BECAUSE OF ALL THE ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN 
RESOLVE AND MANY DIFFICULTIES, I -- UNDER RULE 22(E) HAD 
REVIEWED THE SENTENCE THAT I ISSUED ON MARCH 14TH -- OR 
APRIL 14TH. APRIL 14, 2008. AND IN THIS CASE UNDER RULE 
22(E) I HAVE THE PREROGATIVE OF CORRECTING ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
AT ANY TIME ON MY OWN. IN REVIEWING THE SENTENCE THAT WAS 
ISSUED IN THIS CASE, AFTER WE HAD A SIGNIFICANT REVIEW OF 
WHAT I SAID, I'M GOING TO REVOKE YOUR PROBATION AND SENTENCE 
YOU TO ONE TO 15 YEARS IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON ON EACH OF 
THOSE TO RUN CONCURRENTLY. I'LL SUSPEND THE JAIL SENTENCE 
AND SENTENCE YOU TO RSAT. 
THAT WAS AN IMPROPER SENTENCE. I HAD TO SUSPEND THE 
PRISON SENTENCE. I HAD TO SENTENCE HIM TO JAIL AND THEN HAVE 
HIM REVIEWED BY RSAT. I DID NOT DO THAT. SO THE SENTENCE 
THAT I GAVE WAS AN IMPROPER SENTENCE. AND THEREFORE, I AM 
GOING TO SUSPEND THAT SENTENCE AND WE'RE BACK RIGHT THERE. 
WE'RE AT THE DATE OF APRIL 14. HE HAS JUST ADMITTED HIS 
PROBATION VIOLATIONS, AND SO NOW I'M GOING TO HAVE THAT 
SENTENCING. 
THE DIFFERENCE IS I'VE RECEIVED A PRESENTENCE REPORT 
THAT I DIDN'T HAVE THEN. BUT A LOT OF THE ISSUES THEN ABOUT 
THIS RSAT REVIEW AND ALL THOSE KIND OF THINGS ARE REALLY MOOT 
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BECAUSE I NEED TO GO BACK TO THE DATE THAT THE ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED WHICH WAS APRIL 14. 
SO I'M SUSPENDING THAT SENTENCE AND I'M GOING TO 
HAVE A PROPER SENTENCING ON HIS ADMISSIONS OF THE PROBATION 
VIOLATIONS. THAT'S WHERE WE ARE. 
NOW, IN DOING THAT I HAVE A PRESENTENCE REPORT. I 
KNOW WHAT THE PRESENTENCE REPORT IS. THEY HAVE RECOMMENDED 
PRISON. WHEN I DID THIS BEFORE, I CONSIDERED HIM SCREENING 
FOR RSAT BECAUSE THAT IS A POTENTIAL OPTION WITH THE COURT. 
WHAT I NEED TO DO IS I NEED TO FIND OUT AS THE COURT WHAT 
TOOK PLACE, IF THAT WAS A VALID SCREENING OR NOT. WHAT TOOK 
PLACE BETWEEN COUNSEL AND ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE. WHAT 
DISCUSSIONS, IF ANY, TOOK PLACE. WHETHER THERE WAS A PROPER 
SCREENING. AND I NEED TO DO THAT TO MAKE SURE IF THAT IS AN 
OPTION THAT HE BE SCREENED, THAT I'M SURE HE'LL RECEIVE AN 
APPROPRIATE REVIEW, OR HE MAY NOT RECEIVE AN APPROPRIATE 
REVIEW. 
FURTHER IN THIS -- I KNOW THE STATE — WE'RE GOING 
TO SET SENTENCING AND I KNOW THE STATE'S POSITION. I SAW MR. 
MR. WESTMORELAND WAS HERE. I SAW HIM HERE EARLIER. 
MR. JOHNSON: HE HAD TO LEAVE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: BUT I KNOW THE STATE'S POSITION IS THAT 
I CANNOT REVIEW -- OR I CANNOT SENTENCE HIM BECAUSE OF THE 
11(H) AGREEMENT. 
MR. JOHNSON: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
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THE COURT: HE HAS FILED A MEMORANDUM. I HAD 
SENTENCED HIM UNDER THE 11(H) AGREEMENT WHEN I SENTENCED HIM 
TO PROBATION THE FIRST TIME. THAT WAS THE AGREEMENT THAT WE 
SENTENCED TO. SO WHEN HE ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA, THE 11(H) 
WAS THE SENTENCE THAT I SENTENCED HIM TO IN DECEMBER. THAT 
WAS THE SENTENCE PURSUANT TO THE 11(H) AGREEMENT. 
THE STATUTE — THE UTAH STATUTE WHICH MR. 
WESTMORELAND HAS NOT CITED TO THE COURT INDICATES IN 
77-18-1.1(12) (E) (1). THIS IS WHERE -- NOW YOU SENTENCE 
SOMEBODY AND NOW THEY HAVE A PROBATION VIOLATION 'CAUSE 
THATfS DIFFERENT THAN THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE. NOW SOMEBODY IS 
COMING BEFORE YOU ON A PROBATION VIOLATION. THAT READS, 
"AFTER A HEARING THE COURT SHALL MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT. ONE, 
UPON A FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED CONDITIONS OF 
PROBATION, WHICH IS — THAT'S WHERE WE ARE. WE'RE BACK TO. 
I FOUND THAT HE STIPULATED. HE ADMITTED HE DID THAT. IN 
FACT WENT INTO SOME DETAIL ABOUT HOW HE VIOLATED PROBATION. 
IT SAYS, THE COURT MAY ORDER PROBATION, REVOKED, MODIFIED OR 
THAT THE ENTIRE PROBATION TERM COMMENCE ANEW. AND THE SECOND 
PART OF THIS: IF THE PROBATION IS REVOKED, THE DEFENDANT 
SHALL BE SENTENCED OR THE SENTENCE PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED SHALL 
BE EXECUTED. AND SO IT SEEMS LIKE THE STATUTE WHICH I THINK 
MAY GOVERN OVER THE RULES IN THIS CASE BECAUSE I'M NOT 
SENTENCING ON THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE. I'M SENTENCING HIM ON 
THE PROBATION VIOLATION. AND WHAT THIS STATUTE SAYS IS THAT 
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IF THE PROBATION IS REVOKED, WHICH I DID, THEN THE DEFENDANT 
SHALL BE SENTENCED OR THE SENTENCE PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED SHALL 
BE EXECUTED. SO I THINK THAT'S WHERE I'M EITHER GOING TO THE 
PREVIOUS SENTENCE WHICH WAS CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF ONE TO 15 OR 
I CAN ENTER A SENTENCE. AND WHAT I'M GOING TO DO IS HAVE THE 
SENTENCING HEARING NOW. I'M GOING TO ALLOW THE STATE TO 
PRESENT WHATEVER EVIDENCE THEY WANT TO. I'M GOING TO ALLOW 
YOU TO PRESENT WHATEVER EVIDENCE YOU WANT TO. AND THEN THE 
COURT IS GOING TO ENTER A PROPER SENTENCE. AND THAT'S WHERE 
WE ARE. 
NOW WITH THAT, I DON'T KNOW IF YOU WANT TO DISMISS 
MR. BUSHELL OR WHAT YOU WANT TO DO, BUT WE NEED TO SET THE 
TIME AND DATE FOR THIS SENTENCING TO TAKE PLACE SO THAT BOTH 
OF YOU HAVE ADEQUATE TIME TO PRESENT WHATEVER EVIDENCE THAT 
YOU WANT TO PRESENT TO THE COURT AND THAT WE HAVE A 
SENTENCING HEARING, A PROPER SENTENCING HEARING AND THEN WE 
SENTENCE. 
AND I THINK UNDER RULE 22(E), WITH THAT CORRECTION, 
I HAVE CORRECTED IT. BUT PRIOR TO THAT SENTENCING, I NEED TO 
RESOLVE THIS ISSUE ABOUT RSAT AND ABOUT WHAT TOOK PLACE. AND 
SO I HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF -- IF IT'S GOING -- IF THAT'S 
GOING TO BE HANDLED PROPERLY OR PREJUDICED SO MUCH THAT IT 
CAN'T BE DONE PROPERLY. THAT'S AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW THAT 
THIS COURT IS GOING TO HAVE TO DO PRIOR TO THAT SENTENCE. 
MR. BUSHELL: YOUR HONOR, WITH RESPECT TO THE 
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QUESTION WITH REGARDS TO MY STAYING ON THE CASE, IT WAS JUST 
SOME MISUNDERSTANDING ON WHAT MR. WATERFIELD SAW WHAT 
ACTUALLY HAPPENED LAST TIME WE WERE HERE. RICK AND I DO KNOW 
EACH OTHER. WENT TO LAW SCHOOL TOGETHER. BEFORE WE CAME TO 
WORK FOR THE COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE. WE OFFICED TOGETHER. 
WE WERE NOT PARTNERS BY ANY MEANS, BUT WE KNOW EACH OTHER. 
WE1RE BOTH FRIENDS WITH EACH OTHER. 
AND AFTER COURT AS BRYAN WAS LEAVING I SLAPPED RICK 
ON THE BACK 'CAUSE HE MADE THAT MOTION. I SAID THANKS FOR 
ALL THE WORK I HAD TO DO, IN A SARCASTIC MANNER. 
MR. WATERFIELD THOUGHT I WAS CONGRATULATING HIM ON WINNING. 
THAT WAS NOT THE CASE. 
I WENT DOWN LAST WEEK AND ST WITH BRYAN AND TALKED 
AND WE'RE FINE. WEfRE READY TO CONTINUE FORWARD WITH THIS 
CASE. 
THE COURT: HOW MUCH TIME DOES EACH SIDE NEED FOR 
THE SENTENCE. AND I NEED THE OTHER REVIEW TO TAKE PLACE 
PRIOR TO THE SENTENCING. BECAUSE THEREfS SOME ISSUES RAISED 
THAT RAISE SOME REALLY TROUBLING ISSUES TO THE COURT. 
MR. JOHNSON: THERE WAS A HEARING SET FOR THE 2 9TH, 
YOUR HONOR. 
MR. BUSHELL: I WAS GOING TO ASK TO MOVE THAT 
HEARING ONE ADDITIONAL WEEK SO I CAN GATHER SOME MORE 
INFORMATION. I'M GOING TO HAVE TO SUBPOENA SOME PEOPLE. 
THE COURT: AND SOME WAYS WHAT HAPPENED WAS — I 
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DON'T KNOW WE NEED A HEARING BECAUSE THAT!S MOOT. BECAUSE 
WHAT I'VE DONE TODAY THAT IS MOOT. WHAT I WANT TO DO, BUT I 
DO WANT TO KNOW WHAT HAPPENED BECAUSE IF THERE WAS AN 
IMPROPER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PROSECUTOR AND AP&P, IF 
THERE REALLY WASN'T A PROPER EVALUATION BECAUSE OF SOME 
THINGS THAT TOOK PLACE, I NEED TO KNOW. BECAUSE THAT'S GOING 
TO AFFECT FURTHER SENTENCING IN THIS CASE. AND THOSE THINGS 
ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE COURT, PARTICULARLY 
IF DISCLOSURE OF SOME THINGS WERE NOT ACCURATE AND CORRECT. 
THOSE HAVE ARE VERY IMPORTANT THINGS. 
SO DO YOU WANT TO DO THAT — I MEAN, AND I DON'T 
EVEN KNOW BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THIS IF THE PARTIES AGREED 
ON WHAT TOOK PLACE AND PRESENTED THE COURT ON BOTH SIDES. I 
DON'T KNOW. I DON'T KNOW. AND IT IS REALLY BECAUSE IT 
DOESN'T AFFECT THE SENTENCE. THIS ISN'T A RIGHT THAT 
MR. WATERFIELD HAS TO PRESENT AND TO DO THIS. I'M DOING THIS 
AS THE JUDGE IN THIS CASE, SENTENCING JUDGE, WHERE I HAVE 
PEOPLE COME BEFORE ME AND I HAVE A CONCERN ABOUT WHETHER THEY 
HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY OPEN AND HONEST WITH THE COURT AND IT 
AFFECTS MY ABILITY TO SENTENCE THEN WITH THE ROLE OF A 
PROSECUTOR, AP&P AND IT RELATES TO THE COURT AND 
REPRESENTATIONS BEFORE THE COURT. IT'S A LITTLE DIFFERENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES. THE ISSUE OF THEM REPORTING IT AS A VIOLATION 
IS ALL MOOT WHEN I SENTENCE HIM FOR THAT. SO THAT ISSUE IS 
MOOT. SO MR. WATERFIELD GETTING — HAVING YOU, MR. BUSHELL, 
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COMING ON TO CROSS EXAMINE -- ALTHOUGH MAYBE THE COURT WILL 
SUBPOENA THE RECORDS RATHER THAN YOU SUBPOENA THE RECORDS. I 
DONfT KNOW IF I NEED TO SUBPOENA THE RECORDS. I THINK I CAN 
HOPEFULLY ASK FOR THE RECORDS. 
MR. BUSHELL: CAN WE SET THAT HEARING ON THE 6TH AND 
AT THAT TIME DO WE SET SENTENCING. SINCE YOU ALREADY HAVE A 
P.S.I. 
THE COURT: WE COULD. 
MR. JOHNSON: WILL THAT BE AT 11, YOUR HONOR, THE 
HEARING ON THE 6TH? 
THE COURT: AGAIN, I DON'T KNOW IF THERE NEEDS TO 
HAVE A HEARING, BUT I NEED --
MR. BUSHELL: I'LL SPEAK TO MR. WESTMORELAND. 
THE COURT: IF YOU NEED A CLARIFICATION. MR. 
BUSHEL -- I WOULD LIKE MR. BUSHELL TO PARTICIPATE BECAUSE 
HE'S GOING TO BE DOING THE SENTENCING ON BEHALF OF HIS 
CLIENT, BUT HE NEEDS TO GET THE INFORMATION. BUT IT'S NOT A 
FORMAL HEARING. 
MR. BUSHELL: I WON'T HAVE CROSS-EXAMINATION RIGHTS. 
THE COURT: YES. I JUST NEED TO KNOW WHAT HAS TAKEN 
PLACE. I HAVE AN AFFIDAVIT — PART OF IT, QUITE HONESTLY, 
THE AFFIDAVIT THAT REALLY DIDN'T DO THE ASAM EVALUATION, THE 
SCREENING REALLY DIDN'T TAKE PLACE AND REPRESENTED TO THE 
COURT THAT IT DID. THAT'S A BIG CONCERN FOR THIS COURT IS 
WHAT REALLY TOOK PLACE. THERE WERE REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN 
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COURT AND THEN THERE WERE REPRESENTATIONS MADE AFTERWORDS 
BASED ON EVERYTHING ELSE THAT WHAT WAS REPRESENTED TO THE 
COURT REALLY DIDN'T TAKE PLACE. I JUST NEED TO KNOW AND I 
NEED TO HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING SO THAT I KNOW BECAUSE I NEED 
TO INSURE WHEN HE -- I DO THE SENTENCING THIS TIME IT'S GOING 
TO BE A FAIR SENTENCING WITH ALL THE RIGHTS. 
MR. BUSHELL: WHO DID THE P.S.I. 
THE COURT: WHOEVER DID — I THINK THERE WERE TWO 
INDIVIDUALS. 
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: DAVE HOFFMAN. 
THE COURT: PART OF THIS, THE DIFFICULT SITUATION IS 
MR. WESTMORELAND ALSO REPRESENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THEY HAD 
BEEN DONE AND HE HAD PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THEY HAD BEEN DONE 
AND THOSE KIND OF THINGS. SO I'M CONCERNED POSSIBLY THAT 
SOME OF HIS REPRESENTATIONS (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I JUST NEED IT 
CLARIFIED AND KNOW WHERE WE ARE. 
MR. BUSHELL: AND MR. WESTMORELAND WILL BE HERE FOR 
THAT. 
MR. JOHNSON: HE WILL. 
THE COURT: AND I WOULDN'T MIND THE INFORMATION 
COMING TO ME BEFORE THE HEARING. I JUST WANT TO KNOW WHAT 
HAPPENED. THAT'S ALL. I WANT TO KNOW WHAT TOOK PLACE. AND 
MAYBE WE'LL GET INTO THE WHYS, BUT I NEED TO KNOW WHAT TOOK 
PLACE IN THIS CASE. WE COULD GO ON FOR A LONG TIME. THAT'S 
WHY I WENT BACK AND GRANTED A SENTENCE BECAUSE I WANT IT THIS 
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1 DONE RIGHT. ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT WHERE I AM? 
2 MR. BUSHELL: NO, YOUR HONOR. DO WE HAVE A DATE SET 
3 FOR AFTER THAT HEARING FOR SENTENCING? 
4 THE COURT: WE CAN. I DON'T KNOW IF MR. 
5 WESTMORELAND WANTS TO PURSUE HIS 11(H) MOTION UNDER 
6 SENTENCING GIVEN THE STATUTE, GIVEN WE ARE AT. IF HE DOES, 
7 I THEN HE CAN FILE THAT MOTION. 
MR. JOHNSON: HE MAY, YOUR HONOR. I DON'T KNOW. 
(END OF PROCEEDINGS.) 
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1 CERTIFICATE 
2 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
3 | COUNTY OF DAVIS 
4 
5 I I, JOANNE PRATT, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
6 FOREGOING 10 PAGES OF TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND 
7 ACCURATE RECORD OF THE ABOVE-REFERENCED PROCEEDING TO THE 
8 BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS AN OFFICIAL COURT 
9 REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
10 DATED THIS 23 DAY OF JANUARY, 2009, 
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
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Video 
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2nd Degree 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/10/07 Guilty 
5. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/10/07 Guilty 
HEARING 
Defendant is present in custody. A ruling has been given to 
counsel regarding the State's motion to strike sentencing hearing 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Counsel have reviewed the 
ruling. The Court has found it does have subject matter 
jurisdiction. The State has previously also filed a motion to 
enforce plea agreement pursuant to rule 11 (i) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and request for oral argument. Mr. Bushell did 
not file a response, he understood this to be a mute 
point and that the Court had previously ruled on this. Mr. 
Westmoreland presents argument. Mr. Bushell presents argument. 
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| The Court finds that the wording in the plea agreement did not 
\ bind this Court. Previously the Court found the sentencing which 
£ included RSAT was an illegal sentence. Today for sentencing the 
Court has received a post sentencing report and 
recommendation, which have been reviewed. Today will deal with 
the sentencing on the probation violation which the defendant has 
previously admitted to. 
Regarding sentencing: Mr. Bushell, Mr. Westmoreland each make 
statements. 
11:55 Court is in recess. 
11:59 Court reconvenes. Sentencing proceeds. Mr. Bushell 
addresses some corrections to the post-sentencing report. For 
sentencing for the State, Agent Trent Wynn of AP&P, Agent Kim 
Holden of AP&P, Officer Mia and Mr. Westmoreland 
address the Court. For the defendant, Mr. Bushell, defendant's 
mother Avalon Waterfield and the defendant each address the Court. 
Sentencing proceeds as follows: 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Sentences afe to run CONSECUTIVE. 
Prison Recommendation: Defendant be considered for Conquest 
Program, and if that is completed, it is recommended defendant be 
considered for the Drug Board Program. Further recommendations are 
defendant be granted credit for time served since May 19, 
2008, pay a $500.00 public defender fee and pay $520.00 in 
restitution to the Davis County Metro Narcotics Unit. 
Dated this % day of (Pet / 20 C& . 
JON M MEMMOTT 
District Court Judge 
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